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In 2005, the President of the Bank of Italy blocked the acquisition of Banca 
Antonveneta and Banca Nazionale de Lavoro by the Dutch bank ABN Amro and 
the Spanish bank Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, respectively, for ‘prudential 
reasons and formal errors’. Because it became later public that both deals were 
not blocked for prudential reasons, but to protect domestic banks from foreign 
investors, the EU Commission brought actions against Italy for infringement of 
the principle of the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment. 
The Commission complained that the prudential assessment of potential 
investors lacks procedural transparency and creates legal uncertainty. This, as 
was argued, could lead to a situation in which the supervisory authority can 
refuse authorization based on opaque concerns. A survey of the EU Commission 
(2005b) indicates that interference by supervisors and politicians is not only a 
problem in Italy. The survey identifies the supervisory approval process, the 
‘misuse’ of supervisory powers and political interference as important barrier to 
cross-border consolidation in the EU financial sector (European Commission, 
2005b). 
However, although there is anecdotal evidence that merger control might 
constitute a barrier to cross-border consolidation in the EU banking sector, 
empirical evidence is missing. The main problem is the lack of data on the scope 
for politicians and supervisors to block M&A during merger control. The main 
contribution of this paper is to collect this data and to construct indices on the 
political independence of the supervisory authorities and the transparency of 
merger control. The main source of information is a questionnaire that was sent 
to the supervisors in the 25 EU member countries between October 2006 and 
March 2007.  
The descriptive analysis of the indices shows that the degree of political 
independence of the supervisory authority and the transparency of merger 
control varies across EU countries. Owing to less independent supervisory 
authorities and a less transparent merger control the scope for politicians and 
supervisors to block M&A for protectionism is particularly high in Western 
Europe. Central and Eastern European countries usually have more independent 
supervisory authorities and a more transparent supervisory approval process. 
Descriptive statistics suggest that this might have facilitated cross-border 
consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe and lowered the probability of 
cross-border M&As in Western Europe. The results, furthermore, indicate that 
the proposal of the EU Commission to increase the legal certainty and 
transparency of merger control should promote cross-border consolidation in the 
EU financial sector.    
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Abstract  
In 2005, the President of the Bank of Italy blocked the cross-border acquisition 
of two Italian banks for prudential reasons and formal errors. Because it became 
later public that both deals were not blocked for prudential reasons, but to 
protect domestic banks from foreign investors. A survey of the EU Commission 
indicates that the misuse of supervisory powers and political interference is not 
only a barrier to cross-border consolidation in Italy, but in other EU countries as 
well. Systematic empirical evidence on the role of merger control as barrier to 
M&A is, however, still missing. The main problem is the lack of data on the 
scope for politicians and supervisors to block M&A during merger control. The 
main contribution of this paper is to collect this data and to construct indices on 
the political independence of the supervisory authorities and the transparency of 
merger control. The main source of information is a questionnaire that was sent 
to the supervisors in the 25 EU member countries between October 2006 and 
March 2007.  
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1 Introduction 
In 2005, the President of the Bank of Italy blocked the acquisition of Banca 
Antonveneta (BA) and Banca Nazionale de Lavoro (BNL) by the Dutch bank ABN 
Amro and the Spanish bank Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), 
respectively, for prudential reasons and formal errors. Because it became later public 
that both deals were not blocked for prudential reasons, but to protect domestic 
banks from foreign investors, the EU Commission brought actions against Italy for 
infringement of the principle of the free movement of capital and the freedom of 
establishment. The Commission complained that the supervisory approval process 
lacks procedural transparency and creates legal uncertainty. This, as was argued, 
could lead to a situation in which the supervisor can refuse authorization based on 
opaque concerns, e.g. regarding the ‘stability of governance’ (European 
Commission, 2005a). A survey of the EU Commission on the barriers to cross-
border consolidation in the EU financial sector indicates that protectionism is not 
only a problem in Italy. According to banks with previous experience in M&A, the 
misuse of supervisory powers and political interference are one of the main barriers 
to cross-border consolidation in the EU financial sector (European Commission, 
2005b). 
However, although there is anecdotal evidence that the supervisory approval process 
might constitute a barrier to cross-border consolidation in the EU financial sector, 
systematic empirical evidence is missing. The main problem is the lack of data on 
the scope for politicians and supervisors to block M&A during merger control. The 
main contribution of this paper is to collect this data and to construct indices on the 
independence of the supervisory authorities and the scope for supervisors and 
politicians to block M&A during the merger review process. The main source of 
information is a questionnaire that was sent to the supervisors in the 25 EU member 
countries between October 2006 and March 2007. The survey indicates that the 
degree of transparency of merger control still differs across countries despite the 
legal and regulatory harmonization in the EU in the past. While merger control is 
usually more transparent in Central and Eastern Europe, it is less transparent and 
gives politicians and supervisors more scope to block M&A in Western Europe. 
This may might have facilitated cross-border consolidation in Central and Eastern 
Europe and lowered the probability of cross-border M&A in the banking sectors of 
Western Europe. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents different indicators for the 
degree of banking market integration and shows that EU banking markets are still 
far from being integrated. Section 3 identifies potential barriers to cross-border 
consolidation in the EU banking sector, while Section 4 concentrates on the role of 
merger control as potential barrier to M&A in EU banking markets. In Section 5, we 
construct indices based on a survey among the supervisory authorities in the EU  
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banking sector to measure the scope for politicians and supervisors to block M&A 
during merger control. To find out whether the supervisory approval process 
constitutes a systematic barrier to cross-border consolidation, we present descriptive 
statistics on the link between EU banking sector integration and merger control in 
Section 6. Section 7 concludes.  
2 Banking Sector Integration in Europe 
Financial markets are integrated if domestic and foreign financial institutions face 
the same set of rules that regulate the financial sector and are treated in a non-
discriminatory manner when they operate in the market (Baele et al., 2004 and 
Hartmann et al., 2003). The most accurate and direct way to measure the degree of 
banking market integration would, hence, be to list all frictions and regulations in 
the banking sector and to check if they apply differently to domestic and foreign 
banks. This is, however, impossible (Baele et al., 2004). The degree of financial 
integration can, hence, only be measured indirectly by using price and quantity 
indicators.  
Quantity indicators measure the degree of financial integration based on quantities 
like, for example, the volume of cross-border retail operations (Gual, 2004 and Perez 
et al., 2005). These data suggest that cross-border retail flows are generally much 
less important than wholesale or money market flows in the euro area. Data from the 
Bank for International Settlement suggests that while wholesale and money market 
flows are large across border within the euro area, retail flows are generally less than 
one percent. This not necessarily indicates that there is a lack of retail-banking 
integration if retail business is local and cross-border business limited. For this 
reason, the number of cross-border M&A is often used as an additional indicator for 
integration in the retail field and the absence of such deals is often taken as evidence 
for the fragmentation of retail-banking markets (Cabral et al., 2002). Problematic is 
that a large number of cross-border acquisition need not necessarily indicate a higher 
degree of banking market integration if the acquired bank continues to operate as 
before in the local market so that the pricing conditions does not converge across 
local markets (Cabral et al., 2002). For this reason, quantity indicators are often 
supplemented by price indicators of integration. Such indicators are based upon the 
law of one price and measure the degree of financial market integration based on the 
degree of convergence of interest rates. The idea behind these indicators is that 
identical products should cost the same price in perfectly integrated markets. If this 
is not the case and some financial products have a higher interest rate in one country 
than in another, customers will move from the high-interest rate country to the low-
interest rate country and drive down interest rate differentials in the short to medium 
term. Persistent price differentials for the same products across countries, hence, 
indicate that financial integration is still incomplete. Price indicators suggest that  
  3 
retail prices still differ across countries, while wholesale prices have already reached 
a high degree of convergence. This suggests that retail-banking markets are still 
fragmented along national lines, whereas wholesale markets have already reached a 
high degree of integration (Adam et al., 2002, Baele et al., 2004 and European 
Commission, 2009). 
Problematic is that the prices of retail-banking products often consist of different 
components like the interest rate and a fixed service charge (European Commission, 
2009). Moreover, some products can often only be bought as a package. Certain 
products may, hence, be under-priced to attract new clients, while other products are 
over-priced (European Commission, 2009). The bundling of services is particularly 
widespread in EU retail-banking markets (European Commission, 2009). Because 
data on interest rates is often highly aggregated and not broken down into its 
components, products differ so that the prices of retail-banking products are not 
easily comparable across countries (Cabral et al., 2002). For this reason, it is 
difficult to establish the law of one price in retail-banking markets. Gropp and 
Kashyap (2009), furthermore, argue that perfect price convergence is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for integration, since price indicators are not based on an 
equilibrium concept. Hence, they propose a new test of financial integration based 
on the convergence in banks' profitability. Their test emphasises the role of an active 
market for corporate control and of competition in banking integration. Gropp and 
Kashyap (2009) demonstrate that European listed credit institutions’ profitability 
appears to converge to a common level. There is also weak evidence that 
competition eliminates high profits for these banks, and underperforming banks tend 
to show improved profitability. Unlisted banks differ markedly. Their profits show 
no tendency to revert to a common target rate of profitability. For this reason, Gropp 
and Kashyap (2009) conclude that EU banking markets are still far from being 
integrated. 
3 Barriers to Cross-Border Consolidation in the EU Banking 
Sector 
Besides the difficulties of measuring financial integration in the retail field, the lack 
of integration in EU retail-banking markets might also be explained by the fact that 
retail markets are, in contrast, to wholesale markets still local and cross-border 
business limited (European Commission, 2009). This suggests that the most 
effective way for foreign banks to get access to local retail-banking markets is the 
acquisition of or the merger with a local bank (Cabral et al., 2002). This is consistent 
with the literature that analyzes foreign bank expansion. It usually finds that 
subsidiaries are the dominant entry mode for banks that operate with local clients, 
while branches are more often chosen to provide financial services to local clients 
when they operate abroad (Foccarelli and Pozzolo, 2005 and Cerutti et al., 2007).  
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Subsidiaries are usually established via the acquisition of local banks. However, 
M&A in the non-financial sector still by far outnumber cross-border M&A in the 
banking sector (European Commission, 2009). This suggests that there is a link 
between the fragmentation of retail-banking markets and the low level of cross-
border consolidation in the EU banking sector. Furthermore, the small number of 
cross-border M&A indicates that there are still barriers to cross-border 
consolidation. These barriers are differentiated into market entry and efficiency 
barriers.  
Efficiency barriers refer to factors that make it difficult to own and operate a bank in 
a foreign country (Berger et al., 2000). Cultural diversity, different languages and 
corporate cultures as well as a great physical distance between the subsidiary and the 
parent bank are examples for efficiency barriers. They make the post-merger 
integration process more difficult because different cultures and languages make the 
communication between banks more complicated and delay or even prevent an 
efficient restructuring and reorganisation of the target. This leads to organizational 
diseconomies and reduces the potential of banks to reap benefits from economies of 
scale and scope and increased X-efficiency from cross-border M&A (Berger et al., 
2000). Efficiency barriers also arise from differences in the regulation and 
supervision of banks. Different regulations limit cross-border consolidation because 
multinational banks have to comply with regulations at home and abroad, while 
domestic banks only have to comply with regulations in their home country. This 
gives domestic banks cost advantages because complying with two different sets of 
regulations imposes additional costs on foreign banks. Efficiency barriers, hence, 
lead to considerably lower efficiency gains and might offset most of any potential 
efficiency gains from cross-border M&As (Berger et al., 2000). Consolidation 
across borders is, hence, likely to be limited as long as barriers exist that prevent that 
foreign banks can take the full advantage of potential efficiency gains from this 
consolidation (Berger et al., 2001). This is consistent with a recent survey of the EU 
Commission on the barriers to cross-border consolidation in the EU financial sector 
(EU Commission, 2005b). The survey identifies multiple reporting requirements, 
different product mixes and non-overlapping fixed costs as important barriers to 
cross-border M&A in the banking sector. They prevent that mergers generate 
sufficient cost synergies to offset M&A costs and to create a sufficient return on 
investment. The potential for cost synergies is a key driver for consolidation in 
financial sector, since the proportion of fixed costs in total costs has increased 
rapidly as a result of profound changes of the business economics (EU Commission, 
2005b). 
Cross-border consolidation in the EU financial sector is also limited by market entry 
barriers. Such barriers make it harder or even impossible for banks to enter foreign 
banking markets and to take over or merge with foreign credit institutions. They 
arise from limits on foreign ownership and restrictions on international capital flows.  
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Since many explicit barriers have been lowered over time, implicit barriers may be 
more important to cross-border consolidation in the EU banking sector at present 
(Berger, 2007). In contrast to explicit barriers, they do not single out foreign banks 
in a formal way. Implicit barriers to foreign entry arise when politicians and 
supervisors take actions to prevent foreign entry and expansion in favour of 
domestic banks. These include delaying and denying foreign M&A and encouraging 
domestic banks to merge with each other to become larger and more difficult to 
acquire (Berger, 2007). This was demonstrated in Italy in 2005 in case of the 
acquisition of Banca Antonveneta (BA) and Banca Nazionale de Lavoro (BNL) by 
the Dutch ABN Amro and the Spanish Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA). 
Both deals were blocked by the Bank of Italy. Although the acquisition of BA was 
finally approved, the merger review process considerably delayed the deal and 
increased uncertainty and risk for ABN Amro. The second deal, however, failed after 
BBVA withdrew its takeover bid in response to a counterbid by the Italian insurer 
Unipol for BNL. Because it became later public that both deals were not blocked for 
prudential reasons, but to protect local banks from foreign investors, the EU 
Commission brought actions against Italy for infringement of the principle of the 
free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment. A survey of the EU 
Commission on the barriers to cross-border consolidation in the EU financial sector 
suggests that merger control is not only a barrier to cross-border M&A in Italy, but 
that it constitutes a systematic barrier to cross-border consolidation in Europe. In 
particular, market participants with previous experience in cross-border M&A 
regard merger control, the misuse of supervisory powers and political interference as 
important barrier to cross-border M&A in the EU banking sector (EU Commission, 
2005b).  
Although the anecdotal evidence suggests that merger control has the potential to 
restrict cross-border consolidation in Europe, the number of studies that analyze the 
role of merger control in the banking sector is limited and systematic empirical 
evidence missing. An exception is Carletti et al. (2007). They analyze whether 
changes in merger control legislation toward a greater focus on competition instead 
of financial soundness affect bank stock-prices in the EU banking sector. Their 
results suggest that a stronger focus on competition and efficiency in the merger 
review process leads to a positive reaction of bank stocks. Positive stock market 
reactions are particularly strong if the merger review process is more transparent and 
the authority in charge of merger control more independent. Both reduces the 
discretion of the regulatory process and enhances the efficiency of envisioned M&A 
in the banking sector (Carletti et al., 2007). This paper focuses on merger control in 
the EU banking sector as well. However, in contrast to Carletti et al. (2007), we do 
not concentrate on the efficiency effects of merger control, but on the effect of a 
greater degree of transparency of merger control on domestic and cross-border 
consolidation in the EU banking sector. Since politicians and supervisors have  
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greater scope to block cross-border M&A if merger control lacks transparency, we 
expect that cross-border consolidation should be less advanced in countries where 
merger control is intransparent. Domestic M&A may, in turn, be more likely if 
supervisors and politicians promote mergers among domestic banks to make them 
larger and more difficult to acquire. Since such interventions are usually not driven 
by efficiency considerations, a greater degree of transparency of merger control and 
less scope for political interference should not only make cross-border M&A more 
likely, but should also improve efficiency and boost bank valuation. This is what 
Carletti et al. (2007) find. Together with the anecdotal evidence this suggests that 
merger control may constitute a systematic barrier to cross-border consolidation in 
the EU banking sector. 
4 Merger Control in the EU Banking Sector  
The main objective of merger control is to maintain competition in the market. 
Merger control is, hence, part of competition control. In the EU, merger control is 
regulated in decree No. 4064/1989. The decree determines that the EU Commission 
is responsible for the control of cross-border M&A if the transaction reaches certain 
turnover thresholds (also called ‘Community dimension’). Furthermore, it requires 
that all M&A that create or strengthen a dominant position which impedes effective 
competition shall be declared incompatible with the common market (Art. 2, p. 2). 
M&A between foreign and domestic firms whose turnover exceeds the 
predetermined thresholds and which do not restrict competition in the single market 
should, hence, be approved by the EU Commission. This is, however, not the case 
for M&A that involve banks, because Article 21 of decree No. 4064/1989 grants 
member states the right ‘to take appropriate measures to protect legitimate 
interests’ (Article 21, p. 3). Legitimate interests are defined as public security, 
plurality of the media and prudential rules (Article 21, p. 3, s. 3). Since prudential 
rules relate, in particular, to financial services (European Commission, 1998), 
Article 21 grants member states the right to block cross-border bank takeovers on 
prudential grounds if supervisors are not satisfied with the soundness and prudence 
of the potential investor. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Goodhart et al. (1998) and 
Herring and Litan (1995) list the potential instability and the key role the financial 
sector plays in the economy as reasons for the special regulatory treatment of banks. 
For this reason, merger control in the banking sector is usually focused on the 
soundness and prudence of the new entity and takeovers are approved based on a 
prudential assessment.  
4.1  Prudential Assessment of Bank Mergers  
Because takeovers in the banking sector are subject to a prudential assessment, 
mergers can be blocked by national regulators if they deem the potential investor as  
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not suitable to ensure the sound and prudent management of the target. This allows 
EU member states to block M&A even if they reach ‘Community Dimension’. This 
is also regulated by the existing EU legal framework. It grants supervisors the right 
to veto ownership transfers in the banking sector, if they are ‘in view of the need to 
ensure sound and prudent management of the credit institution, […] not satisfied as 
to the suitability [of the potential investor]‘ (Article 19, p. 1, s. 2 of Directive 
2006/48/EC).  
Problematic is that the current regulatory framework does not provide specific 
criteria that supervisors have to use for assessing the suitability of potential 
investors. Regulators, hence, have considerable latitude in accepting, discouraging 
or rejecting a proposed acquisition. This could lead to undue interference by the 
member states that frustrates investors and makes cross-border M&A impractical. 
This has recently been confirmed by a survey of the EU Commission on the 
obstacles to cross-border consolidation in the EU financial sector (EU Commission, 
2005b). According to market participants with previous experience in M&A, the 
supervisory approval process, the misuse of supervisory powers and political 
interference as barrier to cross-border consolidation are an important barrier to 
cross-border consolidation in the EU financial sector (European Commission, 
2005b).  
Besides this survey evidence, there were also cases in the past in which regulators 
tried to block cross-border M&A for other than prudential reasons. The first case 
that became public was the acquisition of the Portuguese financial group 
Champlinaud by the Spanish bank Banco Santander Central Hispanio in 1999. The 
acquisition was vetoed by the Portuguese government. The grounds for opposing the 
deal included not only ‘late and incomplete notification’ and the ‘absence of a 
transparent structure’ in the new group, but also the ‘necessity to protect the 
national interest” (European Commission, 1999a). The veto was overruled by the 
EU Commission, since it was not justified on prudential grounds (European 
Commission, 1999b). A more recent example is the acquisition of the Banca 
Antonveneta (BA) by the Dutch bank ABN Amro. The deal was announced in March 
2005 and came one day after the Spanish bank Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 
(BBVA) announced to take over Banca Nazionale de Lavoro (BNL). Because both 
deals were blocked by the Bank of Italy for prudential reasons and formal errors, 
Banca Popolare di Lodi (BPL) and the insurer Unipol had time to take over a 
significant shareholding in BA and BNL, respectively. Both deals were promoted by 
the Bank of Italy. Although the acquisition of BA by ABN Amro was approved in 
September 2005, the supervisory approval process considerably delayed the deal and 
increased legal uncertainty and risk for ABN Amro. The acquisition by BBVA, 
however, failed after Unipol announced to take over BNL. Together with the results 
from the EU survey these examples demonstrate that the merger control has the  
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potential to restrict cross-border M&A and to prevent efficiency enhancing M&A in 
the EU banking sector. 
4.2  Directive Proposal of the EU Commission 
Initiated by the events in Italy and the survey the EU Commission proposed to 
change Article 16 of the EU Banking Directive in September 2006 (European 
Commission, 2006a). Article 16 regulates the transfer of ownership in the EU 
banking sector. The proposal’s aim is to considerably improve the legal certainty, 
clarity and transparency of merger control in the EU banking sector (European 
Commission, 2006a). The proposal modifies the existing framework with regard to 
the criteria and the procedure used by the supervisor to assess the suitability of the 
proposed investor.  
The directive proposal sets a list of non-discriminatory criteria according to which 
supervisors have to assess the soundness and prudence of proposed investors. The 
criteria proposed are (1) the reputation of the investor, (2) the experience of the 
future management, (3) the financial soundness of the proposed acquirer, (4) the 
ongoing compliance with EU directives and (5) no connection to money laundering 
and terrorism finance (European Commission, 2006b). These criteria should allow 
courts to decide on the legality and correct application of the merge review process 
in case of the refusal of an application. To control if the supervisory authorities fulfil 
their obligations, they should provide the EU Commission with all relevant 
documents on which they have based their assessment. This should reduce the scope 
for supervisors to block M&A during merger control for reasons that are not 
justified on prudential grounds. Moreover, the EU Commission proposed that the 
reasons that led to the denial of a proposed acquisition should be made public 
(European Commission, 2006b). 
To decrease legal uncertainty and risk, the directive proposal, furthermore, aims at 
reducing the time period supervisors have to veto an acquisition. Under the current 
directive, regulators have three months to veto an acquisition (Article 19, p.1, s.2). 
According to the proposal, the EU Commission plans to reduce the assessment 
period to 30 working days for intra-EU mergers (European Commission, 2006b). If 
the supervisor requests additional information to assess the potential investor, this 
period shall be extended only once and shall not exceed 10 working days. M&A 
involving banks from third countries shall be assessed within a period of maximum 
50 working days (European Commission, 2006b). If the supervisor does not oppose 
the proposed acquisition within this period, the transaction shall be deemed to be 
approved. The reform proposal was implemented in 2007 by Directive 2007/44/EC.  
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5 Indices 
To find out whether merger control constitutes a systematic barrier to consolidation 
in the EU banking sector, we made a survey among the supervisors of the 25 EU 
member countries between November 2006 and March 2007. The aim of the survey 
was to measure the scope for politicians and supervisors to block takeovers in the 
banking sector. The supervisory authorities were asked to provide detailed 
information on ownership limits, reporting and approval requirements for ownership 
transfers in the banking sector as well as the criteria that are used to assess the 
suitability of potential investors during merger control. The questionnaire is 
presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. The questionnaire was filled out by the 
supervisory authorities in the Czech Republic, Italy, Germany, Greece, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, the Slovak Republic and Sweden. In case 
that supervisors did not fill out the questionnaire, we use other sources of 
information like, for example, national banking laws and various reports of the 
International Monetary Fund. We also use these sources of information to cross-
check the information obtained from the questionnaire if possible. Additional 
information comes from the Banking and Supervision Database of the World Bank 
(Barth et al., 2001 and 2006). For a complete list of data sources see Table A2 in the 
Appendix. Based on information from these sources we were able to construct 
indices that measure the scope for politicians and supervisors to block M&A in the 
banking sector for the following 20 EU member countries for the period between 
1997 and 2005: Austria, Finland, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and Italy, as well as Malta, the Czech and Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Poland. The indices 
constructed are: 
1.  Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index 
2.  Transparency of Merger Control Index  
3.  Frequency of Merger Control Index 
Each of these indices measures different aspects of merger control in the EU 
banking sector. The Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index measures the 
degree of independence of the supervisory authority from banks and politicians. If 
supervisors are more independent, politicians and banks are less able to put pressure 
on the supervisory authority to block or promote M&A during the merger review 
process for opaque concerns. The Transparency of Merger Control Index measures 
the degree of transparency of merger control. Regulators are assumed to have more 
scope to protect domestic banks from foreign investors and to block cross-border 
M&A if merger control lacks transparency. Finally, the Frequency of Merger 
Control Index focuses on how often ownership transfers require approval by the 
supervisor. This index, hence, measures how often regulators have the opportunity  
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to block ownership transfers for reasons that are not related to the prudence of the 
proposed investor.  
5.1  Independence of the Supervisory Authority 
The  Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index measures the degree of 
independence of the supervisory authority. The index is constructed based on data 
from the Banking and Supervision Database of the World 
Bank (Barth et al., 2001 and 2006). Additional information comes from 
national banking laws and other sources of information. This is necessary since data 
from the Banking and Supervision Database is only available for the years 1998, 
1999, 2000, 2003 and 2008. The index consists of two components. The first 
component measures the degree to which the supervisory authority is independent 
from the government. 
• If the head of the supervisory authority is only accountable to the Prime Minister, 
the Minister of Finance or any other member of the cabinet, the index gets a value 
of zero.  
• If the head of the supervisory authority is accountable to a legislative body, such 
as parliament or congress, the index gets a value of one.  
This corresponds to the Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index-Political 
(Barth et al., 2006). The second component is the Independence of the Supervisory 
Authority Index-Banks (Barth et al., 2006). This index measures whether supervisors 
are legally liable for damages to a bank caused by its actions. It, hence, measures the 
degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from banks. Both indices 
are used by Carletti et al. (2007) to measure the degree of political independence of 
the supervisor as well. 
• If the supervisory agency can be held liable for damages to a bank caused by its 
actions, the index gets a value of zero.  
• If the supervisory agency cannot be held liable for damages to a bank caused by its 
actions, the index gets a value of one.  
The Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index is calculated as the sum of the 
first and the second component. The index, hence, ranges from zero to two with 
higher values indicating greater independence of the supervisory authority. Figure 1 
shows the  index  for the years 1997, 2001 and 2005. Descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 1. The degree of independence of the supervisor varies across 
countries and years. In general, the supervisory authorities have become more 
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Note: EE-Estonia, CZ-Czech Republic, HU-Hungary, LI-Lithuania, LV-Latvia, MA-Malta, PL-Poland, SK-Slovak 
Republic, SL-Slovenia, AT-Austria, DE-Germany, ES-Spain, FI-Finland, FR-France, GR-Greece, LU-Luxembourg, 
PT-Portugal and SE-Sweden. Bulgaria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, Romania and the United Kingdom are not 
included.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index 
   Obs.  Mean  Median  Max  Min  Std. Dev. 
All  Countries  180 1.10 1.00 2.00 0.00 0.35 
Western  Europe  99  0.95 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.22 
Central and Eastern Europe  81  1.29  1.50  2.00  0.00  0.39 
T-test statistic on the sample mean: Western Europe vs. Central and Eastern Europe: -6.9417*** 
Note: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1-/5-/10-percent level. Descriptive statistics are calculated for the period 
between 1997 and 2005. Western Europe includes Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Central and Eastern Europe comprises the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Bulgaria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Ireland, Romania and the United Kingdom are not included. 
independent over time. In particular, the supervisors in Central and Eastern Europe 
have become more independent. The only exception is Poland where the supervisor 
has lost some of its independence over time. In general, however, the Central and 
Eastern Europe countries have significantly more independent regulators than the 
EU member countries located in Western Europe. The lowest degree of 
independence is reported in France, Italy and Spain. In these countries, the 
supervisory authority is both accountable to the government and the banks 
supervised.  
5.2   Transparency of Merger Control 
The Transparency of Merger Control Index measures the degree of transparency of 
merger control in the EU banking sector. The degree of transparency is measured 
based on the idea that the merger control is more transparent if regulators have to 
assess the soundness and prudence of potential investors based on public criteria like 
the reputation or the financial soundness of the proposed investor. This is in line 
with the proposal of the EU Commission (2006a). The proposal aims at increasing 
the transparency and legal certainty of the supervisory approval process by 
introducing a list of non-discriminatory criteria into national banking laws which are 
known in advance and according to which the regulator has to assess the soundness 
and prudence of a proposed investor. This should reduce the scope for supervisors to 
refuse authorization for reasons that are not related to the prudence of the proposed 
investor. 
The index is constructed as follows: 
• The index gets a value of zero if no specific criteria are listed in national banking 
laws according to which the regulator has to assess the soundness and prudence of 
proposed investors. In this case, the merger review process lacks procedural 
transparency and supervisors are able to refuse authorization based on opaque 
concerns.   
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• If the supervisor assesses the soundness and prudence of a proposed investor based 
on either (1) the reputation, (2) the financial soundness of the proposed investor or 
(3) the experience/skills of future managers and directors, the index value is 0.33. 
Each of these criteria has been proposed by the EU Commission (2006a) in its 
recent reform proposal.  
• If the supervisory authority uses two of these criteria to assess the soundness and 
prudence of proposed investors, the index gets a value of 0.67.  
• If all of these criteria are listed in banking laws, the index gets a value of one.  
The index, hence, ranges from zero to one with higher values indicating that merger 
control is more transparent. Figure 2 shows the Transparency of Merger Control 
Index for the years 1997, 2001 and 2005. Descriptive statistics are presented in 
Table 2. In most countries, merger control lacks procedural transparency. This could 
lead to a situation in which the supervisors can refuse authorization based on opaque 
concerns (European Commission, 2005a). The reform proposal of the EU 
Commission (2006a) intends to change this. It requires the EU member countries to 
provide specific criteria in national banking laws according to which the regulator 
has to assess the soundness and prudence of the proposed investor. This should 
increase legal certainty and reduce the scope for supervisors to block or to push for 
specific M&A. If the proposal is implemented, all EU member states should have an 
index value of one. Some member countries already use part of the proposed criteria. 
These countries are mainly located in Central and Eastern Europe. The most 
frequently used criterion is the financial solidity of the proposed investor. The only 
countries from this region that do not provide any public criteria in their banking 
laws are the Czech Republic and Poland. In general, however, merger control is 
significantly more transparent according to the Transparency of Merger Control 
Index in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe giving supervisors 
considerable more latitude in accepting, discouraging or rejecting a proposed 
acquisition in the latter region. 
5.3  Frequency of Merger Control 
The  Frequency of Merger Control Index measures how frequently ownership 
transfers in the banking sector have to be approved by the supervisory authority. The 
first component of the index measures how large the initial shareholding (in banking 
laws mostly defined as ‘qualified holding’) has to be to become subject to approval 
by the regulator.  
• If the initial shareholding that requires supervisory approval is less than 5 percent, 
the index value is zero.  
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Note: EE-Estonia, CZ-Czech Republic, HU-Hungary, LI-Lithuania, LV-Latvia, MA-Malta, PL-Poland, SK-Slovak 
Republic, SL-Slovenia, AT-Austria, DE-Germany, ES-Spain, FI-Finland, FR-France, GR-Greece, LU-Luxembourg, 
PT-Portugal and SE-Sweden. Bulgaria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, Romania and the United Kingdom are not 
included.  
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Transparency of Merger Control Index 
   Obs.  Mean  Median  Max  Min  Std. Dev. 
All  Countries  180 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.31 
Western  Europe  99  0.03 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.95 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  81  0.37 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.38 
T-test statistic on the sample mean: Western Europe vs. Central and Eastern Europe: -7.8523*** 
Note: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1-/5-/10-percent level. Descriptive statistics are calculated for the period 
between 1997 and 2005. Western Europe includes Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Central and Eastern Europe comprises the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Bulgaria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Ireland, Romania and the United Kingdom are not included. 
• If the initial shareholding is equal to or larger than 5 percent, but less than ten 
percent, the index gets a value of 0.5.  
• If the initial shareholding that requires approval is equal to or larger than ten 
percent, the index value is 1.  
The ten percent threshold is consistent with the EU norm (Art. 4, p. 11 of Directive 
2006/48/EEC). The EU member countries are, however, allowed to set lower limits, 
since the ten percent threshold is only a minimum requirement. Because the scope 
for regulators to block ownership transfers decreases as the size of the initial holding 
that does not require approval increases, a larger value indicates fewer opportunities 
for supervisor to block ownership transfers in the EU banking sector. More 
important than the size of the qualified holding may be how often the increase of an 
existing shareholding has to be approved. The EU norm is that every ownership 
transfer that leads to an increase of a qualified holding so that the shareholding 
exceeds 20, 33 and 50 percent requires additional approval (Article19, p. 1 of 
Directive 2006/48/EEC). The same holds if investors want to reduce their 
shareholding below these thresholds. The EU member states are, however, free to set 
more than three thresholds. The second component of the Frequency of Merger 
Control Index measures whether the EU member countries have used this option. 
• If there are more than or equal to six thresholds that require additional approval by 
the regulator, the index gets a value of zero.  
• If there are 5/4/3 or less than 3 thresholds, the index has a value of 0.25/0.5/0.75/1, 
respectively.  
The Frequency of Merger Control Index is calculated as the sum of the first and the 
second component. The index, hence, ranges from zero to two with higher values 
indicating fewer thresholds and, consequently, fewer opportunities for supervisors to   
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Note: EE-Estonia, CZ-Czech Republic, HU-Hungary, LI-Lithuania, LV-Latvia, MA-Malta, PL-Poland, SK-Slovak 
Republic, SL-Slovenia, AT-Austria, DE-Germany, ES-Spain, FI-Finland, FR-France, GR-Greece, LU-Luxembourg, 
PT-Portugal and SE-Sweden. Bulgaria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, Romania and the United Kingdom are not 
included.  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Frequency of Merger Control Index 
   Obs.  Mean  Median  Max  Min  Std. Dev. 
All  Countries  180 1.52 1.75 2.00 0.50 0.40 
Western  Europe  99  1.51 1.75 2.00 0.50 0.47 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  81  1.54 1.75 1.75 0.75 0.30 
T-test statistic on the sample mean: Western Europe vs. Central and Eastern Europe: -0.4354 
Note: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1-/5-/10-percent level. Descriptive statistics are calculated for the period 
between 1997 and 2005. Western Europe includes Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Central and Eastern Europe comprises the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Bulgaria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Ireland, Romania and the United Kingdom are not included. 
block takeovers. Figure 3 shows the index for 1997, 2001 and 2005. Descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 3. The Spanish supervisor has the most opportunities 
to accept, discourage or reject a proposed acquisition, since it not only has to 
approve every ownership transfer that exceeds 5 percent, but also every ownership 
transfer that increases an existing shareholding above the 10, 15, 20, 25, 33, 40, 50, 
66 and 75 percent threshold. Italy, Portugal, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech and the 
Slovak Republic also report low index values indicating greater opportunities for 
supervisors to block ownership transfers in the banking sector for opaque concerns.  
In general, the Frequency of Merger Control Index does not indicate significant 
differences in the extent of approval requirements between Central and Eastern and 
Western Europe.  
6  Merger Control and Cross-Border Consolidation in the EU 
Banking Sector 
To find out whether merger control constitutes a systematic barrier to cross-border 
consolidation in the EU banking sector, we analyze the relationship between our 
indices and different indicators of banking market integration. The first indicator is 
the total number and the total deal value of domestic and cross-border M&A in the 
EU banking sector. Table 4 indicates that domestic deals are more important than 
cross-border transactions in Western Europe. The largest number of domestic deals 
is reported in the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and France. These countries also 
record the largest number of cross-border M&A. However, relative to domestic 
deals cross-border deals are less important. Cross-border consolidation is more 
advanced in Central and Eastern Europe indicating that these countries are more 
integrated in the EU banking market in terms cross-border M&A than Western 
Europe. Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe not only differ in terms of 
the total number of deals and the total deal value, but also in terms of the average 
deal size. While domestic and cross-border deals are of almost equal size in Western 
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Table 4: Total Number of Deals and Total Deal Value of Domestic and Cross-Border M&A 
in the EU Banking Sector between 1997 and 2005 
   Domestic M&A  Cross-Border M&A 
  Number of Deals  Deal Value 
(Mio. Euro) 
Number of Deals  Deal Value 
(Mio. Euro) 
Austria  23  7,826 13 9,997 
Belgium 73  26,912  26  12,065 
Denmark  38  9,001 20 4,890 
Finland 73  3,372  11  17 
France 162  76,384  67  15,801 
Germany 190  42,586  52  21,864 
Greece 47  2,357  4  429 
Ireland  18  1,625 19 3,670 
Italy 259  51,491  34  5,295 
Luxembourg 19  129  31  5,405 
Netherlands  43  8,054 43 4,543 
Portugal  32  8,097 15 4,105 
Spain 58  30,196  39  1,041 
Sweden 37  1,730  17  485 
United Kingdom  563  106,917  184  43,382 
Western Europe  1,635  376,677  575  132,989 
Cyprus 6  29  6  115 
Czech Republic  17  309  34  4,946 
Estonia 8  0  27  2,062 
Hungary 39  106  30  602 
Latvia 4  0  27  53 
Lithuania 9  86  15  285 
Malta 0  0  1  205 
Poland  45  1,256 54 4,430 
Slovak Republic  5  37  14  1,003 
Slovenia 6  3  4  350 
Central and Eastern Europe 139  1,826  212  14,051 
Source: Zephyr (2008) 
Europe, cross-border transactions are much larger than domestic M&A in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Table 5 indicates that there are large differences across 
countries. While the average cross-border deal is always larger in size in Central and 
Eastern Europe, cross-border M&A are larger only in half of the Western European 
countries. Except of Germany all of these countries belong to the group of smaller 
Western European countries. In contrast, domestic deals are much larger than cross-
border transactions in the larger Western European. This is in line with Boot (1999). 
He argues that in some EU countries central banks, ministries of finance and 
domestic banks operate in close concert to block cross-border and to promote 
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Table 5: Average Deal Si ze of Domestic a nd Cross-Border M&A in the EU Banking Secto r 
between 1997 and 2005 
   Domestic M&A  Cross-Border M&A 
  Number of Deals  Average Deal Size 
(Mio. Euro) 
Number of Deals  Average Deal Size 
(Mio. Euro) 
Austria  23 340 13 769 
Belgium  73 369 26 464 
Denmark  38 237 20 245 
Finland 73  46  11  2 
France  162  472 67 236 
Germany  190  224 52 420 
Greece  47 50  4 107 
Ireland 18  90  19  193 
Italy  259  199 34 156 
Luxembourg 19  7  31  174 
Netherlands  43 187 43 106 
Portugal  32 253 15 274 
Spain  58 521 39  27 
Sweden  37 47 17 29 
United  Kingdom  563 190 184 236 
Western Europe  1,635  230  575  231 
Cyprus 6  5  6  19 
Czech Republic  17  18  34  145 
Estonia 8  0  27  76 
Hungary 39  3  30  20 
Latvia 4  0  27  2 
Lithuania 9  10  15  19 
Malta 0  .  1  205 
Poland  45 28 54 82 
Slovak Republic  5  7  14  72 
Slovenia 6  1  4  88 
Central and Eastern Europe  139  13  212  66 
Source: Zephyr (2008). The average deal size is calculated by dividing the total deal value by the total 
number deals. 
A second indicator for the degree of banking market integration is the market share 
of foreign branches and subsidiaries in the EU banking sector. Subsidiaries are 
usually established via the acquisition of local banks and are the dominant entry 
mode for banks that operate with local clients (Foccarelli and Pozzolo, 2005 and 
Cerutti et al., 2007). This is reflected in Table 6. Table 6 indicates that foreign 
subsidiaries while having a large market share in Central and Eastern Europe usually 
only have a small market share in Western Europe. Notable exceptions are 
Luxembourg and Ireland reflecting their position as international financial centres. 
The large market share of foreign subsidiaries in Finland is the result of a 
consolidation process in the Nordic countries (EU Commission, 2005b). The main 
outcome of this regional consolidation process is the emergence of a large financial 
services group operating in the Nordic and Baltic Sea region. Since Sweden is the  
  
  20 
Table 6: Market Share of Foreign Banks in the EU Banking Sector (2005) 


















Austria 720,534  6,427  137,729  0.01  0.19 
Belgium 1,055,305  49,583  196,620  0.05  0.19 
Denmark  722,096 34,932 114,310  0.05  0.16 
Finland  234,520 12,781 124,175  0.05  0.53 
France 5,090,058  145,951  445,360  0.03  0.09 
Germany 6,826,558  103,346  623,494  0.02  0.09 
Greece 281,066  28,489 49,401  0.10  0.18 
Ireland  941,909 94,974 314,093  0.10  0.33 
Italy 2,509,436  138,996  99,343  0.06  0.04 
Luxembourg  792,418 145,477 603,701  0.18  0.76 
Netherlands 1,697,708  15,827  23,345  0.01  0.01 
Portugal 360,190  19,542  62,009  0.05  0.17 
Spain 2,150,650  159,862  87,319  0.07  0.04 
Sweden 653,178  55,034  3,677  0.08  0.01 
United  Kingdom  8,320,254 3,260,000 1,049,000  0.39  0.13 
Western Europe  32,355,880 427,1221  3,933,576  0.13  0.12 
Cyprus  60,366 4,319 12,338  0.07  0.20 
Czech Republic  104,950 9,694  88,336  0.09  0.84 
Estonia  11,830 1,161 10,573  0.10  0.89 
Hungary  74,653 112 43,871 0.00  0.59 
Latvia  15,570 0  8,276  0.00 0.53 
Lithuania  13,099 0  9,797  0.00 0.75 
Malta  27,195 0  8,802  0.00 0.32 
Poland  152,086 1,385 100,674  0.01  0.66 
Slovak Republic  36,399 8,055 27,383  0.22  0.75 
Slovenia  30,049 523  6,234  0.02  0.21 
Central and Eastern Europe  526,197 25,249 316,284  0.05  0.60 
Source: ECB (2008) 
home base of the group, the market share of foreign subsidiaries is zero in this 
country. This suggests that the small market share of foreign banks in some EU 
member states can at least partly be attributed to the fact that these countries serve as 
home base for large internationally active banking groups (ECB, 2006). Since 
branches are the main entry mode for banks that enter foreign banking markets to 
provide financial services to local clients when they operate abroad, they usually 
have a much smaller market share than foreign subsidiaries (Foccarelli and Pozzolo, 
2005 and Cerutti et al., 2007). They only exceptions are Italy, Spain, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom. In the EU, market entry via branches is easier than via 
subsidiaries, since branches of banks from other EU countries do not need prior 
approval by the supervisor in the host country. 
To find out whether merger control constitutes a systematic barrier to cross-border 
consolidation in the EU banking sector, we calculate piecewise correlation 
coefficients between different indicators of banking market integration and our  
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indices. Since the indices are ordinal-scaled, Spearman rank correlation coefficients 
are used. Rank correlations require at least one ordinal-scaled variable. An 
additional advantage is that Spearman rank correlation coefficients do not require 
normally distributed variables. The results of the correlation analysis are reported in 
Table 7. The correlation analysis suggests that degree of political independence of 
the supervisory authority and the degree of transparency of merger matter for 
domestic and cross-border consolidation in the EU banking sector. The correlation 
between the proportion of domestic and cross-border M&A and the Independence of 
the Supervisory Authority Index and Transparency of Merger Control Index is 
positive and significant. Both indices are also positive and significantly correlated 
with the market share of foreign subsidiaries. Since subsidiaries are usually 
established via the acquisition of or the merger with a foreign credit institution, this 
is in line with our expectations. This is also reflected by the significant and positive 
correlation between the market share of foreign subsidiaries and the proportion of 
cross-border deals. Interesting is that the market share of foreign branches is 
negatively correlated with the Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index and 
Transparency of Merger Control Index. Although the correlations are not 
statistically significant, this may indicate that credit institutions choose branches as 
entry mode in countries where the supervisor is less independent and merger control 
less transparent. This makes sense, since branches of banks from other EU member 
countries have the ‘Single Passport’ and do not need prior approval by the 
supervisor in the host country and, hence, are less likely to be blocked for opaque 
concerns. The frequency of approval requirements, in contrast, does not seem to 
matter for the cross-border consolidation in the EU banking sector. The correlation 
coefficient between the Frequency of Merger Control Index and the proportion of 
domestic and cross-border M&A is almost zero. The correlation between the 
Frequency of Merger Control Index and the market share of foreign subsidiaries is 
not significant as well. 
To summarize, the correlation analysis confirms the picture that greater 
independence of the supervisory authority and a larger degree of transparency of 
merger control promotes cross-border consolidation in EU banking markets. This 
suggests that the proposal of the EU Commission to increase the legal certainty and 
transparency of the merger control should facilitate cross-border M&A in the EU 
financial sector. Since foreign subsidiaries are used to penetrate the local banking 
market and to provide services to local retail customers, this should given that the 
pricing behaviour of the acquired institution changes in response to a change in the 
ownership structure ultimately lead to a higher degree of retail-banking integration 
in Europe. 
  















































Independence of the Supervisory Authority 
Index  1.00            
Transparency of Merger Control Index  0.7917*  1.00               
Frequency of Merger Control Index  -0.0419  -0.1852  1.00         
Proportion of Domestic Deals (Number)  -0.4651*  -0.6522*  0.1628  1.00           
Proportion of Cross-Border Deals (Number)  0.4651*  0.6522*  -0.1628  -1.0000*  1.00         
Proportion of Domestic Deals (Deal Value)  -0.4960* -0.6873*  0.007 0.8403*  -0.8403* 1.00       
Proportion of Cross-Border Deals (Deal 
Value) 0.4960*  0.6873*  -0.007  -0.8403*  0.8403*  -1.0000*  1.00     
Market Share of Foreign Branches (Assets)  -0.1077  -0.205  -0.1006  0.1677 -0.1677 0.1979 -0.1979  1.00   
Market Share of Foreign Subsidiaries (Assets)  0.3174  0.5641* -0.1219  -0.6392*  0.6392* -0.6722* 0.6722*  0.0198  1.00 
Note: Table 6 reports Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the merger control indices and different indicators for banking sector integration in Europe.* indicates significance 
at the 10-percent level. The merger control indices are average values for the period between 1997 and 2005. Statistics on domestic and cross-border deals are based on data on takeover 
activity in the EU banking sector between 1997 and 2005. The market share of foreign branches and subsidiaries in the EU banking sector is calculated based on data for the year 2005.  
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7 Conclusions 
In 2005, the President of the Bank of Italy blocked the acquisition of Banca 
Antonveneta and Banca Nazionale de Lavoro by the Dutch bank ABN Amro and the 
Spanish bank Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria to protect them from foreign 
investors. A survey of the EU Commission indicates that political interference is not 
only an Italian problem. According to the survey, one of the main barriers to cross-
border consolidation in the EU financial sector is the supervisory approval process 
of M&A, the misuse of supervisory powers and political interference (European 
Commission, 2005b).  
However, although there is anecdotal evidence that merger control constitutes a 
barrier to cross-border consolidation in the EU banking sector, systematic empirical 
evidence is missing. The main problem is the lack of data on the scope for 
politicians and supervisors to block M&A for protectionism during merger control. 
The main contribution of this paper was to collect this data and to construct indices 
on the political independence of the supervisory authorities and the scope for 
supervisors and politicians to block M&A during merger control for opaque 
concerns. The main source of information is a questionnaire that was sent to the 
supervisory authorities in the 25 EU member countries between October 2006 and 
March 2007. 
The survey shows that the degree of political independence of the supervisory 
authority and the transparency of merger control still varies across the EU despite 
the legal and regulatory harmonization in the EU in the past. Owing to a lower 
degree of political independence and a lower degree of transparency of merger 
control the scope for political interference and the misuse of supervisory powers is 
particularly high in Western Europe. Central and Eastern European countries, in 
contrast, usually have a more independent supervisor and a more transparent merger 
review process. Spearman correlation coefficients indicate that this might have 
facilitated cross-border consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe and lowered the 
probability of cross-border M&A in the banking sector of Western European 
countries. This suggests that the proposal of the EU Commission to increase the 
legal certainty and transparency of merger control has the potential to promote 
cross-border consolidation. This may ultimately lead also to a higher degree of 
retail-banking integration in Europe and improve the efficiency of the EU banking 
sector.  
However, the low importance of the cross-border dimension in some EU member 
states may also be the result of comparatively higher efficiency barriers in Western 
Europe than in Central and Eastern Europe. This suggests that cross-border 
consolidation will likely to be limited in Western Europe as long as efficiency  
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barriers exist that offset most of the potential efficiency gains from takeovers. 
Furthermore, the survey of the EU Commission suggests that cross-border M&A in 
the EU banking sector are limited by employees’ reluctance and consumer mistrust 
in foreign entities (European Commission, 2005b). Furthermore, a large number of 
domestic deals not necessarily indicate a lack of integration if domestic M&A are 
motivated by the desire to strengthen the market position of banks with view to 
competing effectively in an integrated market (Padoa-Schioppa, 2000). This 
suggests that a more thorough empirical analysis of the determinants that affect the 
decision to take over or merge with a foreign bank is necessary to find out which 
barriers hinder cross-border consolidation and to come to final policy conclusions 
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Appendix 
Table A1: The Questionnaire 
1. Restrictions on Ownership 
a) Was there a maximum percentage of bank capital that could be owned by a single domestic investor (legal entity 
or natural person) between 1990 and 2005? 
 
Yes    No    
 
If yes, please fill out: 
 
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004 2005
Ownership 
limit (in % 
of total 
capital)                                                 
 
b) Was there a maximum percentage of bank capital that could be owned by a single foreign investor (legal entity or 
natural person) between 1990 and 2005? 
Yes    No    
 
If yes, please fill out: 
 
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004 2005
Ownership 
limit (in % 
of total 
capital)                                                 
 
c) Was there a maximum percentage of bank capital that could collectively be owned by foreign investors (legal 
entities or natural persons) between 1990 and 2005?   
 
Yes    No    
 
If yes, please fill out: 
 
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004 2005
Ownership 
limit (in % 
of total 
capital)                                                 
 
2. Approval and Reporting Requirements 
 
a) Did the transfer of bank ownership between domestic investors have to be reported to the supervisory authority 
and/or any other institution (e.g. government, competition authority, central bank) in your country between 1990 and 
2005? 
 
Yes    No   
 
If yes, please explain what percent of bank capital had to be transferred between domestic investors to be subject to 




Percent of Bank Capital:                 Name of the Institution to be informed:                       Time Period:  
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b) Did the transfer of bank ownership between domestic and foreign investors have to be reported to the supervisory 
authority and/or any other institution (e.g. government, competition authority, central bank) in your country between 
1990 and 2005? 
 
Yes    No   
      
If yes, please explain what percent of bank capital had to be transferred between domestic and foreign investors to be 






Percent of Bank Capital:                 Name of the Institution to be informed:                      Time Period: 
 
 
c) Did the transfer of bank ownership between domestic investors require approval by the supervisory authority 
and/or any other institution (e.g. government, competition authority, central bank) in your country between 1990 and 
2005?  
 
Yes    No   
      
If yes, please explain what percent of bank capital had to be transferred between domestic investors to be subject to 






Percent of Bank Capital:               Name of the Institution that gives Approval:                      Time Period: 
 
d) Did the transfer of bank ownership between domestic and foreign investors require approval by the supervisory 
authority and/or any other institution (e.g. government, competition authority, central bank) in your country between 
1990 and 2005? 
 
Yes    No  
      
If yes, please explain what percent of bank capital had to be transferred between domestic and foreign investors to be 







Percent of Bank Capital:               Name of the Institution that gives Approval:                      Time Period: 
3. Transparency of the Supervisory Review Process 
 
a) Bank supervisory authorities in the EU are allowed to block mergers in the banking sector to ensure sound and 
prudent management of credit institutions, if they are not satisfied with the “suitability and qualifications of the 
proposed investor” (Article 19 of the EU Banking Directive). Please note what criteria (e.g. financial solidity, 
reputation of the investor, potential benefits of a merger for customers in your country) your institution used between 






Criteria to assess the suitability of the proposed investor:                                              Time Period: 
 
b) Was the institution in your country legally required to publish the decision and the reasons, if it is not satisfied 
with the suitability and the qualifications of the proposed investor?  
  30 
Yes    No  
 
If yes, please specify (X) in which years the supervisory authority in your country was legally required to publish the 
decision and the reasons for blocking a proposed merger in the banking sector in your country: 
 





reasons                                                 
 
Table A2: Data Sources 
Country  Source  Date
       
AT  Bundesgesetz über das Bankwesen (BWG)  1993
       
CZ Questionnaire  2007
CZ  Czech Republic, Act of the Czech Republic No. 21/1992 Sb. on banks  1992
CZ  New York University School of Law, Conditions for the Establishment of New Banks in the Czech Republic  1994
CZ  New York University School of Law, The Act of July 8, 1994 passed by the Czech Parliament  1994
CZ  Matoušek, R.: The Czech Banking System in the Light of Regulation and Supervision, Selected Issues WP, No. 5.  2005
       
DE Questionnaire  2007
DE  Federal Republic of Germany, Kreditwesengesetz  1988
       
EE  IMF, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) Estonia  2000
EE  Republic of Estonia, Eesti Pank, Law on Credit Institutions   1994
EE  Eesti Pank, Credit Institutions Act  1999
EE  Republic of Estonia,  Credit Institutions Act  2005
       
ES  Republic of Spain, Law 26/1988: Discipline and Intervention of Credit Institutions  1988
ES  Bank of Spain, Law 13/1994: Law of Autonomy of the Banco de España  1994
ES  Republic of Spain, Royal Decree 1245/1995  1995
ES  IMF, Country Report No. 06/218: Financial Sector Assessment Program  2006
       
FI  Republic of Finland, Act on the Operation of a Foreign Credit Institution or Financial Institution in Finland  2001
FI  Republic of Finland, Act on Credit Institutions  2005
       
FR  Banque de France, Comité des Établissements de Crédit et des Entreprises d'Investissement, Annual Report  2005
FR  Banque de France, Comité de la Réglementation Bancaire et financière, French Banking Act 24 January 1984  1984
FR  Republic of France, Regulation 96-16 of December 1996  2001
FR  Republic of France,Regulation 92-13 of 23 December 1992  2005
FR  IMF, Country Report No. 05/186  2005
FR  Republic of France, Regulation 92-14 of December 1992  2006
       
GR Questionnaire  2007
GR  The Impact of the Banking Directives on the Greek Banking System  2004
       
HU  Act CXII of 1996 on Credit Institutions and Financial Entreprises  1997
HU  Act CXII of 1996 on Credit Institutions and Financial Entreprises  2006
HU  Barsi, T., Overview on Banking Regulations. International Law Office Internet Publication  2000
HU  Budai, J. und  H. Bozsonyik, Preperation for Single Market Supervision Tasks  2001
HU  IMF, Country Report No. 05/348  2005 
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HU  Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority: Authorization guidelines (Money Market).  2006
       
IT Questionnaire  2007
IT  Banca of Italy, The 1993 Banking Law  1993
IT  Republic of Italy, The 1993 Banking Law  2000
IT  IMF Country Report No. 04/133  2004
IT  IMF, Financial System Stability Assessment  2006
       
LI Questionnaire  2007
LI  New York University School of Law, Law on Commercial (Joint Stock) Banks  1992
LI  Bank of Lithuania, Operations of Credit Institutions in 2000  2000
LI  Bank of Lithuania, The Law on the Bank of Lithuania  1994
LI  Republic of Lithuania, Law on Commercial Banks  1994
LI  Republic of Lithuania, Law on Banks  2004
LI  Republic of Lithuania, Law on Commercial (Joint Stock) Banks  2005
LI  Operations of Credit Institutions in 2004  2005
LI  Republic of Lithuania, Law on Financial Institutions  2005
       
LU Questionnaire  2007
       
LV Questionnaire  2007
LV  Bank of Latvia, Regulations on granting licenses to perform banking transactions  1993
LV  Republic of Latvia, Law of National Republic of Latvia  1998
LV  Bank of Latvia, Credit Institutions Supervision Department, Annual Report 1999  2000
LV  Bank of Latvia, Operations of Credit Institutions in 2000  2000
       
MA Questionnaire  2007
MA  Banking Act, Act XV of 1994  1994
       
NL  Credit System Supervision Manual, Act on the Supervision of the Credit System 1992  2005
NL  De Nederlandsche Bank, Bank Act 1998  2000
       
PL  New York University School of Law, The Banking Law of January 31, 1989  1992
PL  New York University School of Law, Act of December 19, 1992  1993
PL  Republic of Poland, The Banking Act of August 29, 1997  1998
PL  National Bank of Poland, The Polish Banking System in the Nineties   2001
       
PT Questionnaire  2007
PT  IMF, Financial Sector Assessment Program   2006
       
SK Questionnaire  2007
SK  National Bank of Slovakia, European Banking Directives and Their Implementation in the Slovak Republic  2000
SK  Republic of Slovakia, Act on Banks  2001
       
SL  Republic of Slovenia, Law on Banks and Savings Banks  1991
SL  Republic of Slovenia, Banking Act  1999
SL  Republic of Slovenia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, Banking Act  1999
SL  Republic of Slovenia, Act on the Amandements and Additions to the Banking Act  2001
SL  Bank of Slovenia, Annual Overview  2004
SL  Bank of Slovenia, Law on the Bank of Slovenia  1991
SL  Bank of Slovenia, Bank of Slovenia Act  2002
SL  Bank of Slovenia, Regulation on the Harmonisation of the Amounts of the minimum inital capital of a bank and a savings bank 2004
SL  Republic of Slovenia, Act on the Amandements and Additions to the Banking Act 2   2004
SL  New York University School of Law, Law on Banks and Savings Banks  2007
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SE Questionnaire  2007
SE  Republic of Sweden, The Banking Business Act (SFS 1987:617)  1987
 
Note: EE-Estonia, CZ-Czech Republic, HU-Hungary, LI-Lithuania, LV-Latvia, MA-Malta, PL-Poland, SK-Slovak 
Republic, SL-Slovenia, AT-Austria, DE-Germany, ES-Spain, FI-Finland, FR-France, GR-Greece, LU-Luxembourg, 
PT-Portugal and SE-Sweden. Bulgaria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, Romania and the United Kingdom are not 
included. 
 
 
 
 